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Abstract— Using Geo-social networking like Apple's i
Groups and Hot Potato, many people communicate with
their neighbouring locations through their associates
and their suggestions. Without sufficient location
protection, however, these systems can be easily misused,
in this paper, we introduce, a technique that provides
location secrecy without adding complexity into query
results. Our idea here is to secure user-specific,
coordinate conversion to all location data shared with
the server. The associates of a user share this user’s
secret key so they can apply the same conversion. This
allows all spatial queries to be evaluated correctly by the
server, but our privacy mechanisms guarantee that
servers are unable to see or infer the actual location data
from the transformed data or from the data access.
Key words:Location privacy, security, location-based social
applications, location transformation, efficiency.
I. Introduction
Geosocial networking application is using gps location
services to provide a social interface to the physical world.
Examples of popular social applications include freelancing
networks are created with the specific purpose to allow
users to find or post temporary employment opportunities.
Users establish and operate a professional profile and are
able to connect with past and possible employers,
employees, colleagues, classmates and friends and social
rendezvous [1], local friend recommendations for dining
and shopping [2], [3], as well as collaborative network
services and games [4], [5]. the explosive popularity of
mobile social networks such as scvngr [6] and four square
(3 million new users in 1 year) likely indicate that in the
future, social recommendations will be our primary source
of information about our surroundings. This functionality
comes with significantly increased risks to privacy of the
users. For current services with minimal privacy
mechanisms, these data can be used to infer a user’s detailed
activities, or to track and predict the user’s daily
movements. In fact, there are numerous real-world examples
where the unauthorized use of location information has been
misused for economic gain [7], physical stalking [8], and to
gather legal evidence [9]. Even more disturbing, it seems
that less than a week after Facebook turned on their popular
“Places” feature for tracking users’ locations, such location
data were already used by thieves to plan home invasion
Clearly, mobile social networks of tomorrow require
stronger privacy properties than the open-to-all policies
available today. Existing systems have mainly taken three
approaches to improving user privacy in Geosocial systems:
1) Introducing uncertainty or error into location data relying
on trusted servers or intermediaries to apply Anonymization
to user identities and private data and 3) relying on heavy-
weight cryptographic or private information retrieval (PIR)
techniques. None of them, however, have proven successful
on current application platforms. The challenge, then, is to
design mechanisms that efficiently protect user privacy
without sacrificing the accuracy of the system, To limit
misuse, our goal is to limit accessibility of location
information from global visibility to a user’s social circle.
We identify two main types of queries necessary to support
the functionality of these Geosocial applications: point
queries and nearest neighbour (kNN) queries. Point queries
query for location data at aparticular point, whereas kNN
queries query for k nearestdata around a given location
coordinate.To address this challenge, in this paper, we
proposelocation to index mapping), a novel approach to
achievinguser privacy while maintaining full accuracy in
locationbasedsocial applications (LBSAs from here
onward).Our insight is that many services do not need to
resolvedistance-based queries between arbitrary pairs of
users, butonly between friends interested in each other’s
locationsand data. Thus, we can partition location data
based onusers’ social groups, and then perform
transformations onthe location coordinates before storing
them on untrustedservers. A user knows the transformation
keys of all herfriends, allowing her to transform her query
into the virtualcoordinate system that her friends use. Our
coordinatetransformations preserve distance metrics,
allowing anapplication server to perform both point and
nearest neighbour queries correctly on transformed data.
However,the transformation is secure, in that transformed
valuescannot be easily associated with real-world
locationswithout a secret, which is only available to the
members ofthe social group. Finally, transformations are
efficient, inthat they incur minimal overhead on the LBSAs.
Thismakes the applications built on LocX lightweight
andsuitable for running on today’s mobile devices.The
challenge, then, is to design mechanisms that
efficientlyprotect user privacy without sacrificing the
accuracy of thesystem, or making strong assumptions about
the security ortrustworthiness of the application servers.
More specifically,we target geo-social applications, and
assume that servers (andany intermediaries) can be
compromised and, therefore, areuntrusted. To limit misuse,
our goal is to limit accessibility of circle. We identify two
main types of queries necessary tosupport the functionality
of these geo-social applications: pointqueries and nearest-
neighbour (kNN) queries. Point queriesquery for location
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data at a particular point, whereas kNNqueries query for k
nearest data around a given locationcoordinate (or up to a
certain radius). Our goal is to supportboth query types in an
efficient fashion, suitable for today’smobile devices.To
address this challenge, in this paper, we propose LocX(short
for location to index mapping), a novel approachto
achieving user privacy while maintaining full accuracyin
location-based social applications (LBSAs from here
onwards).Our insight is that many services do not need
toresolve distance-based queries between arbitrary pairs of
users,but only between friends interested in each other’s
locationsand data. Thus, we can partition location data
based onusers’ social groups, and then perform
transformations on thelocation coordinates before storing
them on untrusted servers.A user knows the transformation
keys of all her friends,allowing her to transform her query
into the virtual coordinatesystem that her friends use. Our
coordinate transformationspreserve distance metrics,
allowing an application server toperform both point and
nearest-neighbour queries correctly ontransformed data.
However, the transformation is secure, inthat transformed
values cannot be easily associated with realworld locations
without a secret, which is only available tothe members of
the social group. Finally, transformations areefficient, in
that they incur minimal overhead on the LBSAs.This makes
the applications built on LocX lightweight andsuitable for
running on today’s mobile devices.
II. Related Work
A. Prior Work on Privacy in General Location-Based
Service
There are mainly three categories of proposals on
providinglocation privacy in general LBSs that do not
specificallytarget social applications. First is spatial and
temporalcloaking, wherein approximatelocation and time is
sent to the server instead of the exactvalues. The intuition
here is that this prevents accurateidentification of the
locations of the users, or hides the useramong k other users
(called k-anonymity),and thus improves privacy. This
approach, however, hurtsthe accuracy and timeliness of the
responses from the server,and most importantly, there are
several simple attacks onthese mechanisms that can still
breakuser privacy. Pseudonyms and silent times areother
mechanisms to achieve cloaking, where in deviceidentifiers
are changed frequently, and data are nottransmitted for long
periods at regular intervals. This,however, severely hurts
functionality and disconnects users.The key difference
between these approaches and our workis that they rely on
trusted intermediaries, or trusted servers,and reveal
approximate real-world location to the servers inplain text.
In LocX, we do not trust any intermediaries orservers. On
the positive side, these approaches are moregeneral and,
hence, can apply to many location-basedservices, while
LocX focuses mainly on the emerging Geosocial
applications. The second category is locationtransformation,
which uses transformed locationcoordinates to preserve user
location privacy. One subtleissue in processing nearest
neighbour queries with thisapproach is to accurately find all
the real neighbours. Blindevaluation using Hilbert Curves
[21], unfortunately, canonly find approximate neighbours.
To find real neighbours,previous work either keeps the
proximity of transformedlocations to actual locations and
incrementally processesnearest-neighbour queries [28], or
requires trusted thirdparties to perform location
transformation between clientsand LBSA servers [29]. In
contrast, LocX does not trust anythird party and the
transformed locations are not related toactual locations.
However, our system is still able todetermine the actual
neighbours, and is resistant againstattacks based on
monitoring continuous queries [30], [31].
The third category of work relies on PIR [16] to
providestrong location privacy. Its performance, although
improvedby using special hardwares [17], is still much
worse than allthe other approaches, thus it is unclear at
present if thisapproach can be applied in real LBSs.
B. Prior Work on Privacy in Geosocial Services
For certain types of Geosocial services, such as
buddytracking services to test if a friend is nearby, some
recentproposals achieve provable location privacy [18], [19]
usingexpensive cryptographic techniques such as secure
twoparty computation. In contrast, LocX only uses
inexpensivesymmetric encryption and pseudorandom
numbergenerators.The closest work to LocX is Longitude
[32], [33], whichalso transforms locations coordinates to
prevent disclosureto the servers. However, in longitude, the
secrets fortransformation are maintained between every pair
of friendsto allow users to selectively disclose locations to
friends. Asin, longitude can let a user reveal her location to
only asubset of her friends. In contrast, LocX has a simpler
threatmodel where all friends can access a user’s
information andhence the number of secrets that users have
to maintain isonly one per user. LocX can still achieve
location and user unlinks ability. In addition, LocX can
provide more versatile Geosocial services, such as location-
based socialrecommendations, reminders, and others, than
just buddytracking as in the above prior work.
C. Anonymous Communication Systems
These systems, including Tor [34], provide anonymity
tousers during network activity. One might ask, then,
whyusing Tor to anonymously route data to LBSA servers is
not sufficient. This approach seems to provide privacy as
theserver only sees location data but not the identity of the
userbehind that data. However, recent research has revealed
thathiding the identity of the users alone is not sufficient
toprotect location privacy. Even if Tor is used, it is
possiblefor an attacker with access to the location data to
violate ourprivacy and unlinkability requirements. For
example, usinganonymized GPS traces collected by the
servers, it has beenshown that users’ home and office
locations, and even useridentity can be derived [23], [24],
[25], [26]. LocX defendsagainst such attacks and meets all
our requirements.
D. Systems on Untrusted Servers
In the context of databases, recent systems proposedrunning
database queries on encrypted data (stored onuntrusted
servers), using heavy-weight homomorphic [35]or
asymmetric encryption [36] schemes. These approachesare
suitable for spatial data outsourcing or data miningscenarios
where the data are static and are owned by limitednumber of
users. But they are less suitable for LBSAs,where the data
are dynamic and personal, and thus cannotbe encrypted
under a single secret key. In the context oflocation and
social applications, Persona [37] and Adeona
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[38] Also relied on encrypting all data stored on
untrustedservers to protect user privacy. Persona focused on
privacyin online social networks, and Adeona focused on
privacyin device tracking systems where there is no data
sharingamong users. Applying Persona’s mechanisms to
LBSAsdirectly would encrypt all location coordinates,
makingLBSAs unable to process nearest-neighbour queries.
But iflocation is not encrypted, attacks using anonymized
GPStraces, mentioned above, can succeed, and making
Personainsufficient to protect location privacy. Similarly,
Adeona isuseful for a user to retrieve her own data, but not
the datafrom her friends. Our contributions complement
thesesystems. Some techniques in these papers can help
LocX aswell, for example, Persona’s approach to partition
datashared with friends into fine-grained groups, and
Adeona’shardware-assisted approaches to speed up crypto
processing.
Main Modules:
1. Locx module
2. proxy server
3. index server
4. Data Server
LOCX Module:
Loc X builds on top of the basic design, and introduces two
new mechanisms to overcome its limitations. First, in Loc
X, we split the mapping between the location and its data
into two pairs: a mapping from the transformed location to
anencrypted index (called L2I), and a mapping from the
index to the encrypted location data (called I2D). This
splitting helps in making our system efficient. Second, users
store and retrieve the L2Is via untrusted   proxies. This
redirection of data via proxies, together with splitting,
significantly improves privacy in LocX. For efficiency,
I2Ds are not proxied, yet privacy is preserved (as explained
later).
Proxying L2Is for location privacy:
Users store their L2Ison the index server via untrusted
proxies. These proxies can be any of the following: Planet
Lab nodes, corporate NAT sand email servers in a user’s
work places, a user’s home and office desktops or laptops,
or Tor [34] nodes. We only need a one-hop indirection
between the user and the index server. These diverse types
of proxies provide tremendous flexibility in proxying L2Is,
thus a user can store her L2Is via different proxies without
restricting herself to a single proxy. Furthermore,
compromising these proxies by an attacker does not break
users’ location privacy, as (a) the proxies also only see
transformed location coordinates and hence do not learn the
users’ real locations, and (b) due to the noise added toL2Is
(described later). To simplify the description, for now,
weassume that the proxies are non-malicious and do not
collude with the index server. But we will later describe our
solution in detail to even defend against colluding,
malicious proxies. With this high-level overview, we now
describe our solution to store and query data on the servers
in detail. We also explain the challenges we faced, and the
tradeoffs we made in makingour solution secure and
efficient.
Storing L2I on the index server:
First consider storing L2I on the index server. This
transformation preserves the distances between points1, so
circular range and nearest neighbour queries for a friend’s
location data can be processed in the same way on
transformed coordinates as on real-world coordinates. Then
the user generates a random index (i) using her random
number generator and encrypts it with her symmetric key to
obtain at the transformed coordinate on the index server via
a proxy. The L2I is small in size and is application
independent, as it always contains the coordinates and an
encrypted random index. Thus the over head due to
proxying is very small.
Storing I2Ds on the data server:
The user can directly storeI2Ds (location data) on the data
server. This is both secure and efficient.
1) This is secure because the data server only sees the index
stored by the user and the corresponding encrypted blob of
data. In the worst case, the data server can link all the
different indices to the same user device, and then link these
indices to the retrieving user’s device. But this only reveals
that one user is interested in another user’s data, but not any
information about the location of the users, or the content of
the I2Ds, or the real-world sites to which the data in the
encrypted blob corresponds to.
2) The content of I2Dis application dependent. For example,
a location-based video or photo sharing service might share
multiple MBs of data at each location. Since this data is not
proxied, LocX still maintains the efficiency of today’s
systems.
Mechanisms:
In this we use Locx Mechanisms is used in this project.
1) Alice and Bob exchange their secrets,
2) Alice generates and L2I and I2D from her review of the
restaurant (at (x, y)), and stores the L2I on the index server
via a proxy.
3) She then stores the I2D on the data server directly.
4) Bob later visits the restaurant and fetches for L2Is from
his friends by sending the transformed coordinates via a
proxy.
5) He decrypts the L2I obtained and then queries for the
corresponding I2D, 6) finally Bob decrypts Alice’s review.
III.System Design
A. Basic Design
The server should support different types of queries
(point,circular range and nearest neighbour queries) on
location data.For the server to be able to do this, we need to
reveal thelocation coordinates in plain text. But doing so
would allowthe malicious server to break a user’s location
privacy.To resolve this problem, we propose the idea of
coordinatetransformation. Each user u in the system
chooses a set ofsecrets that they reveal only to their friends.
These secretsinclude a rotation angle θu, a shift bu, and a
symmetric keysymmu. The users exchange their secrets via
interactionswhen friends meet in person, or via a separate
trustedchannel, such as email, phone etc. The secret angle
and shiftare used by the users to transform all the
locationcoordinates they share with the servers. Similarly,
the secretsymmetric key is used to encrypt all the location
data theystore on the servers. These secrets are known only
to thefriends, and hence only the friends can retrieve and
decryptthe data. For example, when a user u wants to store
areview r for a restaurant at (x, y), she would use her
secretsto transform (x, y) to (x1, y1) and store encrypted
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review E(r)on the server. When a friend v wants to retrieve
u’s reviewfor the restaurant at (x, y), she would again
transform (x, y)using u’s secret (previously shared with v),
retrieve E(r),and then decrypt it using u’s symmetric key to
obtain r.
Similarly, v would transform (x, y) according to each of
herfriends’ secrets, obtain their reviews, and read them.
Weonly focus on point queries for now. Figure 1 depicts
thisbasic design.
A limitation.
This basic design has one important limitation: the
servercan uniquely identify the client devices (for e.g., using
theIP address). Using this, the server can associate
differenttransformed coordinates to the same user (using the
IP).
Sufficient number of such associations can break
thetransformations (as we show in Section 5). So
maintaining
Unlinkability between different queries is critical.
Oneapproach to resolve this limitation is to route all
queriesthrough an anonymous routing system like Tor [34].
Butsimply routing the data through Tor all the time will be
in efficient. Especially in the context of recent LBSAs,
thatadds larger multimedia files (pictures and videos) at
eachlocation. So we need to improve this basic design to be
bothsecure and efficient.
Fig. 1 A basic design
In the basic design
1) Alice and Bob exchange their secrets
2) Alice stores her review of the restaurant (at (x, y)) on
theserver under transformed coordinates,
3)Bob later visits the restaurant and queries for the
reviewson transformed coordinates,
4) Decrypts the reviews obtained.
B. Overview of LocX
LocX builds on top of the basic design, and introduces
twonew mechanisms to overcome its limitations. First,
inLocX, we split the mapping between the location and
itsdata into two pairs: a mapping from the
transformedlocation to an encrypted index (called L2I), and
a mappingfrom the index tothe encrypted location data
(called I2D). This splittinghelps in making our system
efficient. Second, users storeand retrieve the L2Is via
untrusted proxies. This redirectionof data via proxies,
together with splitting, significantlyimproves privacy in
LocX. For efficiency, I2Ds are notproxied, yet privacy is
preserved
1. Decoupling a location from its data:
Location data data(x, y) corresponding to the
realworldlocation (x, y) is stored under (x, y) on theserver.
But in LocX, the location (x, y) is firsttransformed to (x1,
y1), and the location data isencrypted into E(data(x,y)).
Then the transformedlocation is decoupled from the
encrypted data using arandom index i via two servers as
follows:
1) AN L2I = [(x1, y1),E(i)],which stores E(i) under
thelocation coordinate (x1, y1), and
2) AN I2D = [i,E(data(x,y))], which stores the
encryptedlocation data E(data(x,y)) under the random index
i.The index is generated using the user’s secret
randomnumber generator. We refer to the server storing
L2Isas the index server and the server storing I2D as
thedata server. We describe these two as separate serversfor
simplicity, but in reality they can be on the sameserver, and
our privacy properties still hold. Thisseparation of location
information into two components(L2I and I2D) helps us
continue to efficiently rundifferent types of location queries
on L2Is and retrieveonly relevant I2Ds.Figure 2 depicts the
design of LocX.
Fig. 2 design of LocX
1) Alice and Bob exchange their secrets, 2) Alice
generatesand L2I and I2D from her review of the restaurant
(at (x,y)), and stores the L2I on the index server via a proxy.
3)She then stores the I2D on the data server directly, 4)
Boblater visits the restaurant and fetches for L2Is from
hisfriends by sending the transformed coordinates via a
proxy,
5) He decrypts the L2I obtained and then queries for
thecorresponding I2D, 6) finally Bob decrypts Alice’s
review.
2. Proxying L2Is for location privacy:
Users store their L2Is on the index server via
untrustedproxies. These proxies can be any of the
following:PlanetLab nodes, corporate NATs and email
serversin a user’s work places, a user’s home and
officedesktops or laptops, or Tor [34] nodes. We only need
aone-hop indirection between the user and the indexserver.
These diverse types of proxies providetremendous
flexibility in proxying L2Is, thus a user canstore her L2Is
via different proxies without restrictingherself to a single
proxy. Furthermore, compromisingthese proxies by an
attacker does not break users’location privacy, as (a) the
proxies also only seetransformed location coordinates and
hence do notlearn the users’ real locations, and (b) due to
the noiseadded toL2Is. To simplify the description, for now,
weassume that the proxies are non-malicious and do
notcollude with the index server. But we will laterdescribe
our solution in detail to even defend againstcolluding,
malicious proxies. With this high-leveloverview, we now
describe our solution to store andquery data on the servers
in detail. We also explain thechallenges we faced, and the
tradeoffs we made inmaking our solution secure and
efficient.
Building Applications Using Locx
Here we sketch how to build LBSAs using LocX. We
demonstratethe usage of our APIs by building three
applications.In today’s systems that provide these services,
the data isentrusted to the server in plain-text, which
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performs thecomputations in the application logic. Trust the
server in LocX, the application logic that computeson the
plain-text location data is moved to the client.
Location-based reminders.This application users place
remindersfor friends at specific locations (for e.g. reminder
tobuy milk near a grocery store), and when the friends are
atthat location, an alert is generated on their device. To
build thisapplication in our model, a user bundles all the
details aboutthe reminder, such as the reminder text and
time, encrypts thewhole bundle and generates a
corresponding I2D. Then theuser transforms the reminder
location based on the friend’ssecret and generates a
corresponding L2I. These pieces arestored on the servers
with a putL2I and a putI2D calls. Eachuser periodically runs
a neighbourhood query for data from herfriends. First the
user takes her current location, transforms itaccording to her
secret, runs a neighbourhood query, and fetchesthe L2Is and
I2Ds, if any, using the getL2I and getI2D calls.Then the
device decrypts and reminds the user as
appropriate.Location-based recommendations.This
application aims torecommend nearby sites (restaurants,
shopping malls, etc.)to users based on the reviews given to
these sites by theirfriends. In our model, this application is
built as follows.A user stores her reviews by generating a
bundle containingall the information related to the review,
such as the reviewtext, rating, etc., encrypts the bundle
using her symmetric key,and generates a L2I and I2D using
the data. The locationsof the sites are transformed, of
course, while generating theL2Is. This information is then
stored on the servers using theputL2I and putI2D calls. The
application on each user’s mobiledownloads the data from
her friends at the user’s currentlocation by running a
neighbourhood query. Then it decrypts thereturned data, and
plots the recommended sites on a map in thedevice. Thus,
the application operates without even revealingusers’
location to the servers.Friend locator.This application alerts
a user whenever a friendis in the vicinity. When this
application is built on LocX, userscheck-in at their current
location periodically; then users checkfor friends in the
vicinity by running a neighbourhood queryaround their
current location and decrypting check-ins fromfriends in
recent times (e.g. last ten minutes). Despite using neighbour
query, this approach to building friend locator is
stillefficient. Even a hotspot (e.g. a concert) in the real
coordinatespace is usually not a hotspot in the transformed
coordinatespace due to user-specific location
transformations, and thuslimits the amount of (irrelevant)
data received and processedby a user.
IV.Conclusions
This paper describes the design, prototype
implementation,and evaluation of LocX, a system for
building locationbasedsocial applications (LBSAs) while
preserving userlocation privacy. LocX provides location
privacy for userswithout injecting uncertainty or errors into
the system, anddoes not rely on any trusted servers or
components. LocXtakes a novel approach to provide
location privacy whilemaintaining overall system efficiency,
by leveraging thesocial data-sharing property of the target
applications. In
LocX, users efficiently transform all their locations
sharedwith the server and encrypt all location data stored on
theserver using inexpensive symmetric keys. Only friends
withthe right keys can query and decrypt a user’s data.
Weintroduce several mechanisms to achieve both privacy
andefficiency in this process, and analyze their
privacyproperties. Using evaluation based on both synthetic
andreal-world LBSA traces, we find that LocX adds
littlecomputational and communication overhead to
existingsystems. Our LocX prototype runs efficiently even
onresource constrained mobilephones. Overall, we believe
that LocX takes a big steptowards making location privacy
practical for a large classof emerging geo-social
applications.
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